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Abstract. Security models for PAKE protocols aim to capture the de-
sired security properties that such protocols must satisfy when executed
in the presence of an active adversary. They are usually classified into
i) indistinguishability-based (IND-based) or ii) simulation-based (SIM-
based). The relation between these two security notions is unclear and
mentioned as a gap in the literature. In this work, we prove that the
SIM-based model of Boyko, Mackenzie and Patel [3] and the IND-based
model of Abdalla, Fouque and Pointcheval [1] are equivalent, in the sense
that a protocol proven secure in one model is also secure in the other
model.
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1 Introduction
The Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) problem asks for two enti-
ties, who only share a password, to engage on a conversation so that they agree
on a session key. The established session key can be used to protect their subse-
quent communication. PAKE’s protocols play a key role in today’s world as they
allow for authenticated key exchange to occur without the use of public-key in-
frastructure, by using instead a human memorable password. Theoretically they
are extremely interesting, because of their ability to use a weak secret to produce
a strong one in a provably secure way over a hostile communications network.
The nature of passwords makes PAKE protocols vulnerable to dictionary at-
tacks. In such attacks an adversary tries to break the security of the protocol by
simply brute forcing all possible combinations of passwords. One must keep in
mind that on-line dictionary attacks cannot be entirely prevented in PAKE pro-
tocols. An attacker could enumerate (off-line) the words in the directory being
likely to be passwords. Then simply take a password at random, interact with
a legitimate party by running the protocol and check whether the key exchange
succeeds for the candidate password or not. The cryptographic goal, when defin-
ing security for PAKE protocols is to ensure that the attacker essentially cannot
do better than this trivial strategy, which implies resistance to off-line dictionary
attacks.
We consider the provable secure approach, where protocols are analyzed in a
complexity-theoretic security model, the goal being that no reasonable algorithm
can violate security under various hardness assumptions. These complexity-
theoretic security models are classified into indistinguishability based (IND-
based) and simulation-based (SIM-based). Roughly speaking, in the IND-based
approach security means that no computationally bounded adversary can dis-
tinguish an established session key sk from a random string. The SIM-based
approach defines two worlds: an ideal world which is secure by definition and
a real world which is the real protocol execution against some computationally
bounded attacker. In the SIM-based setting, security asks for the computational
indistinguishability between ideal world and real world executions.
The first IND-base security model for PAKEs was proposed by Bellare,
Pointcheval and Rogaway in 2000 [2]. They consider that for a good PAKE
protocol, the chances of an adversary defeating the protocol goal should depend
on how much she interacts with the protocol participants rather on her off-line
computing power. We will refer to this model as IND-FtG model. In 2005 Ab-
dalla, Fouque and Pointcheval proposed a security model for PAKE [1] which is
usually known as the IND-RoR model. It is built upon IND-FtG model. In [1]
the authors proved that model the IND-RoR model is strictly stronger than the
IND-FtG model.
Boyko, Mackenzie and Patel proposed a SIM-based security model for PAKEs
in 2000 [3]. Their work is an extension of Shoup’s security notion for Authenti-
cated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols [5].
Contributions: While the equivalence between SIM and IND models for
AKEs is shown in [5], there is no work on the relation between these security no-
tions for PAKEs. In fact it is mentioned as a gap in [1] and [4]. In this work, we fill
the gap by proving the equivalence between the SIM model of Boyko, MacKenzie
and Patel [3] and the IND-RoR model of Abdalla, Fouque and Pointcheval [1].
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